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Notes on the Subaltern: Or, How Postcolonial Critique Meets the Perpetrator 1 
Let me begin with an image: the body of a child, drained of life and color. Its mouth slightly 2 
parted; white, unblinking spots where there were once, perhaps, seeing eyes. Its torso – broken 3 
flesh, broken bone – encased in broken stone.i  4 
Then the story: December 3rd, 1984. The populace of the city Bhopal in central India is gassed 5 
with 27 tons of methyl isocyanate that leaked from a pesticide factory: “It felt like somebody 6 
had filled our bodies up with red chillies, our eyes tears coming out, noses were watering, we 7 
had froth in our mouths” (Champa Devi Shukla, quoted by International Campaign for Justice 8 
in Bhopal 2014). Within 24 hours, this city-turned-gas-chamber claimed over two thousand 9 
lives, devastated over 150,000 bodies, thousands of which were – which are – yet to be born. 10 
The next morning, a father buries his child. “Unable to bear the thought of never seeing her 11 
again”, we are told, “he brushed away the dirt for one last look”. 12 
The catastrophe in Bhopal has been described as an act of corporate killing (Jones 1988), the 13 
effect of a moral disregard for socioeconomically subjugated populations (Mukherjee 2010; 14 
Fortun 2000). Thus, the image represents not only the violation of a particular child but also 15 
the many bodies similarly devastated, and those yet awaiting this fate. The destruction of the 16 
body, the irruption of organic matter, visible in the image, then, speaks the singular and 17 
historical act of killing. To think the event as such – i.e. as killing – evokes the question of 18 
perpetration. That is, it compels us to ask after the performers and performance of act(s) of 19 
injury. Following this line of inquiry, some studies of Bhopal have produced a detailed account 20 
of particular actors, corporate and political, involved in the variety of decisions that precipitated 21 
the leak, thereby tracing a line between doer(s) and deed (cf. Ali 1987; Chouhan et al. 1994). 22 
Others have taken a broader view, seeking to historicize the event through a consideration of 23 
the socio-political and economic particularities that engendered the event (cf. Guillette 2008; 24 
Shrivastava 1987). To be sure, each of these approaches is concerned with the question of 25 
accountability not merely for the purpose of redress but also to think through the possibilities 26 
of preventing similar disasters in the future. Yet, evaluations of accountability are contingent 27 
upon the location of agency – whether within individual or structural contexts – so that 28 
investigations of perpetration are concerned, in fact, with agency as the condition of possibility 29 
for the act.  30 
In this chapter, I interrogate the significance of agency in contexts such as Bhopal. In particular, 31 
I focus on Bhopal as activity against the subaltern and outline the implications of asking the 32 
question of perpetratorship therein. Insofar as perpetrator studies is concerned with the figure 33 
of the perpetrator, it assumes the agency of a self-knowing subject whose performative capacity 34 
is embedded in particular ethico-political rationalities (cf. Feldman 1991). Moreover, given 35 
that scenes of violation are constituted through the triangulation of subject, object and act, the 36 
rationale that describes agency simultaneously describes its object. For instance, in the case of 37 
Bhopal, the rationalization of agency lies between the poles of economic fundamentalism,ii and 38 
economic and political expediency.iii Accordingly, the victims of the leak are either ill-fated 39 
objects of rescue or expendable objects of contempt. Within the contemporary global regime 40 
of human rights, the latter description seems inadmissible so that the figure of the perpetrator 41 
is approached as a transgressor against an established moral order. Yet, the image of the child, 42 
I suggest, is a representation not merely of transgression but, more crucially, of repetition. That 43 
is, as I will argue in this chapter, whereas perpetration as transgression signifies a wrongful 44 
rupture in the moral order, the perpetration of violence against subaltern bodies is part of an 45 
ongoing history of killing, one whose rationality flows from the description of the subaltern as 46 
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expendable. Thus, acts of violence against subaltern bodies are a repetition of killing as 47 
constitutive of the moral order.  48 
Understanding violence against the subaltern as such requires us to re-think approaches to 49 
perpetration. In order to do so, I will introduce the figure of the subaltern and outline how 50 
postcolonial studies can contribute to the encounter between perpetrator studies and the 51 
subaltern. Thereafter, I will use the concept of agential separability to critique our (possible) 52 
investments – as witness/researcher/writer – in the figure of the perpetrator and acts of 53 
perpetration, especially in relation to the violation of subaltern bodies.  54 
I begin, however, with a brief outline of the imperative to re-think approaches to perpetration. 55 
Re-encountering perpetrator studies 56 
As already noted, perpetrator studies generally seeks to address the figure of the perpetrator 57 
and to comprehend the conditions that facilitated associated acts of perpetration. This approach 58 
tends towards the evental wherein historical consideration focuses largely upon the context for 59 
the acts rather than their own historicity. To consider the historicity of an act is to recognise 60 
not only its material but also its onto-epistemic lineage. Such an approach would necessitate a 61 
shift away from the figure perpetrator towards the signifying effects of perpetration. In 62 
particular, it requires a rethinking of the relation between doer and deed. Most accounts of 63 
agency posit a causal relation between doer and deed, wherein the doer is imagined separate 64 
from, and prior to, the deed. This description of agency follows from the notion of action as an 65 
effect of will.  66 
 67 
Contrary to this view, Nietzsche’s oft-cited critique of agency asserts that “there is no “being” 68 
behind the doing, acting, becoming” he writes, ““the doer” has simply been added to the deed 69 
by the imagination - the doing is everything” (1956, 178–79; added emphasis). This follows 70 
from his postulation of will not as an effect of reason (as per Kant) but as “simply a matter of 71 
commanding and obeying, on the groundwork… of a society constructed out of many “souls”” 72 
(2002, 20; see also 1956, 190-191). Here, soul is a “subject-multiplicity” or “a society 73 
constructed out of drives and affects”” (2002, 14; added emphasis). Thus, Nietzsche views the 74 
idea of will as that which “merely captures the idea that mental entities have an urge to be 75 
realised” (Risse 2007, 65). All activity, then, is simply actualisation. 76 
 77 
For Nietzsche, the agent is not the source of an act but is rather a rationalising myth that serves 78 
the purpose of identifying a contemporaneous origin or source of injury. As such, the 79 
appending of doer to deed is an effect of the law of contract that requires a responsible subject 80 
in order to dispense punishment for the infliction of suffering (1956, 194–98). This approach 81 
to agency as invention signals a rejection of the Kantian notion of morality as a system of a 82 
priori principles, the understanding and abiding of which are imperative for the ethical (or 83 
human) subject. Instead, Nietzsche argues, “morality [must be] understood as a doctrine of the 84 
power relations under which the phenomenon of “life” arises” (2002, 20; added emphasis). 85 
That is, morality is a system of ends, one that seeks to formalise the subjugation of certain 86 
affects and drives that, through a dominating power, come to be described as evil to others that 87 
come to be described as good. It is through this dynamic of valorization that the appearances 88 
of an ideal life and moral world are created. It is also, therefore, within this context alone that 89 
any interpretation of activity and ascription of accountability becomes possible. 90 
 91 
If we accept this proposition, then focusing on the figure of perpetrator and the singularity of 92 
perpetration inhibits our ability (1) to interrogate the historicity of the moral framework that 93 
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evaluates action as perpetration and (2) to comprehend perpetration as a historical force, or 94 
drive, that produces the world as we perceive it. A concern, instead, with the signifying effects 95 
of perpetration would provide insight into the creation of the contemporary global moral order 96 
and the significance of the drives that have been suppressed therein, drives that are ultimately 97 
unleashed in perpetrative activity.  98 
 99 
As already indicated, in this chapter I seek to approach violence against subaltern bodies, such 100 
as that evidenced in Bhopal, as iterative activity that rehearses their institution as expendable 101 
objects. If, as Nietzsche proposes, it is only a moralising force that demands that the 102 
suppression of “bad” drives in relation to the “good”, then it is this same force – the judgement 103 
of a moralistic order – that mistakenly anticipates the life of the subaltern and laments its death. 104 
I substantiate this proposition in the next section through an engagement with this figure. 105 
Thereafter, I propose postcolonial critique as a methodology that can help us approach 106 
perpetration as the actualisation of the subaltern as expendable.  107 
Encountering the subaltern 108 
In 1968, Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) (a subsidiary of the U.S. Union Carbide 109 
Corporation), set up its Pesticides and Formulations plant in Bhopal, at the behest of the Indian 110 
government. The development of this plant was in keeping with India’s post-independence 111 
industrialisation project intended towards economic growth and national prosperity. The choice 112 
of Bhopal as the site for this production facility was deliberate due to its status as a fledgling 113 
city and the capital of the relatively “undeveloped” state of Madhya Pradesh. Given this 114 
circumstance, the government required opportunities to expand employment as well as to 115 
create a confidence-building precedent that could attract greater foreign investment. 116 
The state’s push towards industrial growth was concomitant with the devalorization of 117 
traditional methods of agriculture, resulting in an economically untenable rural to urban 118 
migration. Indeed, a substantial portion of the communities outside the factory walls were made 119 
up of first and second generation migrants displaced from their rural communities by the 120 
imposition of mechanized agriculture (Mukherjee 2010). These people, who were lured to 121 
urban areas for the economic betterment promised by the state’s development visions, settled 122 
in colonies outside the factory “without papers”. This precarious situation coerced a silence 123 
that they hoped would protect them from evacuation by the city (Chouhan et al. 1994). 124 
Eventually, in order to improve its own image, UCIL handed out land deeds to some in these 125 
communities despite the fact that they had failed to establish the necessary safety zones. But 126 
the residents themselves had little idea that “the plant was producing one of the most dangerous 127 
compounds ever conceived by the chemical industry” (Guillette 2008, 174). In fact, a project 128 
manager for the plant described the development of this project as “analogous to planting a 129 
bomb near where people live and children play” (Fortun 2001, 117). 130 
The pain and suffering that unfolded in the aftermath of the Bhopal gas leak epitomize the 131 
experience of suffering as “actively created and distributed by the social order itself” (Das 132 
1995, 138). Whether it be the physical pain described by survivors like Champa Devi Shukla 133 
(quoted above) or the spectacular representation of pain on the child’s body in Rai’s image – 134 
each iteration is ultimately an embodied “stamp of the authority of society upon the docile 135 
bodies of its members” (1995, 138). That is, pain is the actualization of an originary onto-136 
epistemic injury that instituted the subaltern within the economy of death. I substantiate this 137 
further by describing how the subaltern is constituted as a collection of traces.  138 
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An engagement with the figure of the subaltern may begin with a consideration of the 139 
Gramscian definition of subalternity as the condition of being subjugated by hegemonic power. 140 
Specifically, subalternity demarcates a political location that is sharply distinct from and in 141 
strong opposition to elite domination. Furthermore, this distinction may be understood as the 142 
basis for the formation of a unified subaltern identity and hence of collective action (cf. Guha 143 
1981; Green 2010). Within the postcolonial, and specifically Indian, context, this description 144 
of the subaltern was appropriated by The Subaltern Studies Collectiveiv in an endeavored to 145 
recuperate the historical agency of the underclasses – and the Indian peasant, in particular – 146 
from their suppression within colonial and national/ist historiography. Through this 147 
historicization, the work of the Collective came to record the mis-/displaced representations of 148 
the subaltern wrought by hegemonic (colonial and bourgeois nationalist) ideals. In so doing, 149 
these writings were able to present the subaltern as “that impossible thought, figure, or action 150 
without which the dominant discourse cannot exist and which is acknowledged in its 151 
subterfuges and stereotypes” (Prakash 1994, 1483). In other words, even though the writings 152 
of the Collective were committed to historical rectification and recovery, their account of the 153 
subaltern implicated the violent, and violating, itinerary of colonial, and ultimately “Western”, 154 
power in absenting the subaltern. Their work thus anticipated the condition of the subaltern as 155 
trace.  156 
The trace may be understood as the mark of an erasure enacted in the constitution of a given 157 
object (Derrida 1973; Derrida 1997). An object emerges qua object – i.e. functions as signifier 158 
– by entering into a “system of differences” (1973, 145). In particular, the object is structured 159 
through the erasure of all that is different or other. This is the condition of possibility for the 160 
appearance of objects as such. The trace, then, is the “silent mark” (1973, 132) – the mark of 161 
that which has been rendered absent, invisible – in the production of appearances. To be sure, 162 
this mark is contained, albeit elided, in the appearance, so that trace is, in fact, constitutive of 163 
the it. Indeed, the trace belongs to the structure of the object, it is that which “opens appearance 164 
and signification” (1997, 65). 165 
The “postcolonial turn” in subaltern studies, and specifically the work of literary theorist 166 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, takes up this notion of the trace to offer a critical description of 167 
the subaltern. While the Subaltern Studies Collective undertook to describe the historio-168 
materialist erasure of the subaltern under colonialism, Spivak’s work furthers this description 169 
through a consideration of the subaltern as an effect of onto-epistemic erasures. Specifically, 170 
she draws attention to the erasure of particular modes of existence that are the condition of 171 
possibility for the emergence of the human as phenomenon. As such, the subaltern is the mark 172 
of these erasures, indeed is “a site of unlisted traces” (1999, 6), that constitutes the human. 173 
Practically speaking, then, the subaltern appears as “a position without identity” constituted 174 
through an exclusion from “institutional [onto-epistemic and, hence, sociopolitical] 175 
infrastructure” (Spivak 2005, 476). This exclusion the renders the speech of the subaltern 176 
unhearble and its activity unrecognizable as such. Spivak’s description of the subaltern thus 177 
recognises this figure as an effect of onto-epistemic disappearance.  178 
Now, in Derrida’s view, the fidelity of an object is contingent upon the continued erasure – i.e. 179 
the guarantee of the non-exposure – of the trace. For the irruption of the trace would bring into 180 
crisis not only the coherence of the object as signifier but also its primacy in relation to its 181 
others.v Moreover, in the instance where a trace does become revealed, its constitution as object 182 
– as a nameable and knowable entity – always already effects new erasures. That is, insofar as 183 
the trace is the condition of possibility for the emergence of objects, the apparent liberation of 184 
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a trace – i.e. the making present that which is absented – always already entails further 185 
absenting.vi  186 
Accordingly, insofar as the subaltern is the trace that constitutes the human, the suppression of 187 
subalternity – its continued invisibility – is the condition of possibility for the appearance of 188 
humanity. Furthermore, the irruption of subalternity as disappeared difference always already 189 
threatens the signification and primacy of humanity. The perpetual material and epistemic 190 
effacement of the subaltern guarantees the ontological security of the human. As such, 191 
expendability is the essential characteristic – the ontological condition – of the subaltern.  192 
Thus, in the case of contemporary activity against the subaltern, focus on the figure of the 193 
perpetrator as agent of injury elides both the originary and iterative violence. In order to remain 194 
faithful to the subaltern as trace, it is necessary to comprehend activity against the subaltern as 195 
an ongoing doing, the realisation of an urge, albeit conditioned, to expunge subalternity so as 196 
to assure the unfolding of humanity. Killing, then, is merely the manifestation of a drive that 197 
realises the subaltern as expendable. In the following section I propose postcolonial critique as 198 
a methodology that facilitates this recognition. 199 
The methodology of postcolonial critique 200 
Over three decades on, the chemical plant in Bhopal still stands as a toxic rem(a)inder of the 201 
events of 1984. Even as its after-effects continue to wreak havoc on the lives of survivors, 202 
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC, now Dow Chemicals) has been excused from formal 203 
liability for the leak. However, as an expression of moral responsibility,vii UCC contributed 204 
approximately $130 million to various emergency, health and vocational funds. During this 205 
period, it simultaneously argued against the litigation of any claims against it, and especially 206 
so within the U.S. judicial system. This move was substantiated by assertions of an 207 
unresolvable “cultural difference” between India and the U.S., one that imputed deficient, 208 
indeed perverse, moral-cultural “values” (Fortun 2001). viii  209 
This circumstance had serious implications for any possibility of justice for the workers and 210 
residents of Bhopal. The presumed cultural deficiencies of survivors rendered them unreliable 211 
sources who produced exaggerated accounts of injury. Moreover, the inability of survivors to 212 
translate injury into scientific/medical language removed their own experiences and 213 
understanding from carrying juridical import, thereby subjugating self-knowledge to 214 
institutional claims to scientific and legal expertise (cf. Das 1995; Jasanoff 2007). 215 
Consequently, in a performance of moral duty, the Indian government and UCC undertook to 216 
negotiate a settlement under the principle of parens patriae. In so doing, they deprived victims 217 
of the leak the right to represent themselves, and to opt out of proxy representation. Instead the 218 
government viewed this curtailment of the rights as “[t]he appropriate response… such that the 219 
largest good of the largest number is served. Justice, then, was a utilitarian quantification” 220 
(Fortun 2001, 40).  221 
This circumstance epitomizes how, for the subaltern, every appearance is a disappearance. In 222 
the first instance, the subalternity of the survivors of Bhopal always already denied them the 223 
sociopolitical infrastructure required to be seen and heard (Spivak 2005). Moreover, absent 224 
access to this infrastructure, they lacked recognisable agency, where agency names 225 
“institutionally validated action, assuming collectivity” (2005, 475).  It is this apparent lack of 226 
agency that validated the state’s paternalistic intervention. Moreover, in order to reclaim 227 
agency, it became necessary for survivors to “metonymise/synecdochise [themselves], 228 
understand the part by which [they were] connected to that abstract whole so that [they could] 229 
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claim it” (2005, 483). This is evident in the requirement to narrate injury through the rational 230 
discourses of science and law. This refiguring of speech is the re-enactment of an originary 231 
erasure – i.e. the negation of any existential difference. In other words, in order to make 232 
themselves seeable and hearable, survivors had to disappear their onto-epistemic selves. Every 233 
appearance is a disappearance. 234 
The repetition of epistemic pain evident herein is authorized by the juridical imperative to 235 
designate a “doer” and “deed”. That is, in order to arrogate accountability and provide redress, 236 
the state must identify a wrong doer – here, UCC – as the source of material injury – and 237 
indicate wrongful act – here, negligence. Yet, material and epistemic pain are not related as 238 
cause and effect. Rather, given the ontological condition of the subaltern, material injury is 239 
merely the repetition of the originary onto-epistemic injury that produced the subaltern as the 240 
other of the human. Moreover, the ongoing onto-epistemic suppression of survivors rehearses 241 
the rendering of the subaltern as trace. The material and epistemic pain evidenced in Bhopal 242 
are thus entangled – i.e. they “lack an independent, self-contained existence” (Barad 2007, ix). 243 
As such, material and epistemic pain are not separate but can be made to appear as if separate 244 
(non-mutual) through the in(ter)vention of the figure of the perpetrator. More importantly, this 245 
apparent separation absents the epistemic violence inherent in material injury. In the next 246 
section, I will propose an underlying purpose for the investment in material injury and the 247 
associated imperative for accountability as it emerges in perpetrator studies. In this section, 248 
however, I focus on how postcolonial critique remains faithful to the subaltern by asserting the 249 
material and epistemic pain as entangled.   250 
If colonialism names “the historical process whereby the ‘West’ attempts systematically to 251 
cancel or negate the cultural difference and value of the ‘non-West’” (Gandhi 1998, 16), then 252 
postcolonial critique marks an opening towards these negations that approaches what is lost 253 
therein. Specifically, it signals an attentiveness to subjugations, or foreclosures, of particular 254 
modes of knowing and existence as effected by the universalising of “Europe” – i.e. the 255 
institution of a spatio-temporally specific ontoepistemology as world historical. Consequently, 256 
postcolonial critique is the practice of traveling the “fault lines [of dominant discourse] in order 257 
to provide different accounts, to describe histories revealed in the cracks of the colonial 258 
archaeology of knowledge” (Prakash 1994, 1486). This archaeology entails an accounting of 259 
humanism, the fundamental proposition of Enlightenment that enabled the imposition of 260 
universality as the condition of ontoepistemic subjugation. Colonial subjugation is the 261 
institution of native modes of existence and knowing as differentially human. In this context, 262 
postcolonial critique advances itself through anti-humanist contention.ix 263 
In particular, the method of postcolonial critique, consists of historicizing the subaltern. To be 264 
sure, such historicization does not merely entail the rectification of and recovery from the 265 
edifice of history but rather necessitates a confrontation with “sites of legitimation and 266 
authorization” (Feldman 1991, 2) that suppress subalternity. Insofar as the figure of the human 267 
is designated as the agent of History, to historicize the subaltern is to ask after the historical 268 
practices that have foreclosed her from this phenomenon of the human. Below I engage 269 
Hortense Spillers’ account of violence perpetrated against the African body under coloniality 270 
as an instance of such historicization.x  271 
In her text ‘Mama’s baby, Papa’s maybe’, Spillers notes that the African slave trade with/in 272 
the Americas is generally regarded as a case of “high crimes against the flesh” (1987, 67). 273 
Here, injury is seen to proceed through flesh in its “seared, divided, ripped-apartness, riveted 274 
to the ship’s hole, fallen, or “escaped” overboard” (1987, 67). Flesh, according to Spillers, is 275 
the primary medium through which the body is written as text – before body there is flesh – so 276 
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that the violation of body is the disintegration of a text and thus the dissolution of person to 277 
mere matter. She explicates this circumstance as the “theft of the body” (1987, 67) that 278 
inaugurated the New World order. During the Middle Passage the body qua body is in 279 
suspension – dissolved of all its indigenous signification and produced as undifferentiated mass 280 
it awaits a new inscription – through name, identity, signification – that will be gained only 281 
upon reaching land at the other end (1987, 72). As such, the relation between body and person 282 
is severe through material violation from which follows the external imposition of meanings 283 
and uses. This represents a theft, a  “severing of the captive body from motive will and desire” 284 
(1987, 67). Spillers’ account of injury thus affirms how the instrument of torture, wielded 285 
by/for the slave master upon flesh, also effect onto-epistemic effacement.  286 
Moreover, the distinction between body and flesh, according to Spillers, is the primary 287 
distinction between liberated and captive subject-positions. To wit, the black female body, as 288 
the objectified other, is produced through instruments of torture, through acts of material 289 
wounding. The markings of torture thus effected – what Spillers refers to as a “hieroglyphics 290 
of flesh” –  become invisible once the body materializes within a cultural code organized 291 
through skin colour. Yet, despite this invisibility, the hieroglyphs are transferred across 292 
generations so that the body, marked by colour and other culturally identifiable determinants, 293 
remains vulnerable to “protocols of “search and destroy”” enacted by and for the state (1987, 294 
67). The liberation of the black female from captivity and her restoration as subject is thus 295 
always already an impossibility. Indeed, the unfolding of violation follows from the imperative 296 
to keep the black female body, and all that it has been made to signify, as the absented presence 297 
– the trace – that constitutes humanity. So that all ongoing activity against this figure is a 298 
historically authorized doing of an originary material and onto-epistemic deed. All activity 299 
against the subaltern is thus a signifying performance. 300 
Insofar as postcolonial critique recognises these enactments as such, it demands an 301 
attentiveness to the historicity of perpetration, the replication of a practice exemplified in 302 
Spillers’ account above. Such historicization reveals how the emergence of the subaltern and 303 
the subject as, respectively, external to and the objectification of the human are an effect of “a 304 
doctrine of the power relations” (Nietzsche 2002, 20). Indeed, these power relations effect, and 305 
are effected by, material practices that affirm a specific articulation of morality – one that posits 306 
the figure of the subaltern as ethically degraded and hence expendable. Consequently, 307 
postcolonial critique insists on recognizing acts of injury against the subaltern not as 308 
transgressions against, but instead fundamental to, the contemporary moral order. 309 
To comprehend activity against the subaltern through the figure of a perpetrator, then, is to 310 
fundamentally misapprehend her. Such readings of perpetration betray a faith in the moral 311 
order of liberal humanism, in the liberalized fiction of the human. Liberal humanism seeks to 312 
liberate the subaltern as trace – that is, to make forms of existence previously ejected from 313 
humanity appear as such. In other words, liberal humanism assumes the possibility of rendering 314 
the figure of the subaltern as subject. Only then can activity against the subaltern can be held 315 
as immoral and/or unlawful, so that the designation of a perpetrator becomes viable. Yet, as 316 
evidenced above, the condition of possibility for the (institutional) appearance of the figure of 317 
the subaltern as a legible entity is its (onto-epstemic) disappearance. The subaltern, thus, is not 318 
an easily recuperable subject-position. Accordingly, one becomes compelled to ask what 319 
purpose a concern with the figure of the perpetrator and an ensuing demand for accountability 320 
serves in relation to activity against the subaltern.   321 
In order to attempt a response, the final section of this chapter advances an ethical concern with 322 
the notion of agential separability. 323 
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Agential separability: How postcolonial studies meets the perpetrator 324 
The case of Bhopal, as outlined in this chapter, reveals how for the subaltern recuperation is 325 
the re-enactment of annihilation. The subaltern qua subaltern has no place within humanity; to 326 
make it occupy such a space is to deny its essence. Concerns with “responsibility” and 327 
“accountability” within the contemporary human rights regime compel the legibility of the 328 
subaltern. Such legibility, however, is merely a legitimation of the human, one that rehearses 329 
the subaltern as the mark of death.  330 
Recalling the Nietzschean description of morality as a system of ends, it may be argued that 331 
the pursuit of accountability for the subaltern as an object of perpetration becomes imperative 332 
primarily in order to institutionalize appearances of “good” and “evil”. The pursuit of 333 
accountability, however, is not identical to the pursuit of justice. From the perspective of 334 
postcolonial critique, this necessitates, in the first instance, staying with the subaltern as trace. 335 
In the previous section, I suggested that such faithfulness to subaltern makes imperative a 336 
practice of historicization that comprehends perpetration as a signifying gesture.  337 
Furthermore, the possibility of justice for those abandoned by humanity – those that remain 338 
unseen and unheard within it – lies not in some form of restoration that “deal[s] with a past 339 
[but rather with] retribution [that] seeks to create a certain kind of present moment and future”, 340 
a moment that can begin to “build [community] anew where it never before existed” (Stauffer 341 
2015; added emphasis). That is, justice entails repair intended towards a renewed form of 342 
relations rather than mere redress (i.e. “fixing” that which has been destroyed to some imagined 343 
original form). This form of reparative justice requires, in the first instance, creating anew the 344 
conditions for seeing and listening. This makes imperative the turning of the gaze from the 345 
subaltern back onto ourselves as observers in an attempt to comprehend our own relationality 346 
with the subaltern. To do so, we must recognise ourselves as separable from subalternity.  347 
Agential separability is a condition of “exteriority within (material-discursive) phenomena” 348 
(Barad 2003, 825). Barad offers this concept as a critique of the ontological determinism that 349 
establishes differences as fixed. Agential separability affirms difference as neither a priori 350 
nor an absolute distinction, but rather the consequence of an agential cut made by 351 
instruments of observation and comprehension that produces separation within phenomena 352 
(2007, 140). Thus, for instance, agential separability allows us to comprehend how the notion 353 
of rational agency produces a cut within the phenomenon of the human in order to produce 354 
the subaltern as different from the subject and external to the human.  355 
 356 
Crucially, agential separability reconfigures the notion of agency as “not an attribute but the 357 
ongoing reconfigurings of the world” (2003, 818). That is, agency is not a causal force acting 358 
between entities – i.e. between a subject who has agency and an object that lacks it – but 359 
rather designates a relational force that facilitates the mutual becoming of separable entities. 360 
It is “a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that someone or something 361 
has…. It is the enactment of iterative changes to particular practices…” (2007, 178 original 362 
emphasis). Agency, then, does not presume action according to a motive will exercised by 363 
already constituted entities. Rather, it lies in the iterative performance of material-discursive 364 
practices that affirm entities as different. Thus, reading activity against the subaltern through 365 
the figure of the perpetrator – specifically, through a causal description of agency – is itself a 366 
part of the violent “doing”. 367 
 368 
Alternately, a refiguration of agency – one that moves away from a juridical concern with 369 
causality to an ethical concern with separability – allows us to recognise how the liberal 370 
 9 
humanist order produces a cut between the figure of the perpetrator as wrong doer and the 371 
observer as judge to establish them as morally distinct entities. This separation allows the 372 
observer to distance themselves not only from the perpetrator but also from the act of 373 
perpetration. Insofar as perpetration is iterative activity, the observer is also able to disregard 374 
their existence as an effect of the originary cut that ejected the subaltern from the field of 375 
humanity. This, I propose, is the tacit investment in grasping the figure of the perpetrator in 376 
relation to activity against the subaltern.  377 
Given its ethical investment in historicizing the subaltern, postcolonial critique forces a 378 
recognition of the observer as separable from, and hence a co-produced effect of, the observed. 379 
It thereby compels a self-implicating reckoning with onto-epistemic complicity in ongoing 380 
activity against the subaltern. It is as such that postcolonial critique meets the perpetrator. 381 
 382 
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i ‘Burial of an unknown child’, captured by the Indian photographer, Raghu Rai. 
ii Specifically, the faith in developmentalism as key to social, and indeed human, progress. 
iii In his study of the crisis, Paul Shrivastava describes Bhopal as ‘a textbook example of a 
rapidly developing city that sought – and obtained – sophisticated Western-style 
industrialization without making a commensurate investment in industrial infrastructure or 
rural development’ (1987, 57). Indeed, the state’s push towards industrial growth through the 
concomitant devalorisation of traditional methods of agriculture resulted in an economically 
untenable rural to urban migration. Moreover, the location of the Union Carbide factory 
violated the city’s own zoning codes. But Union Carbide sought to appease these concerns by 
funding a public park. In return, Municipal Commissioners who sought to move the factory 
were replaced by those who were more amenable to state and corporate aspirations (Ali 1987, 
175). The promise of economic growth thus seemed to warrant the expedient execution of 
business deeds.  
iv The Subaltern Studies Collective was initially comprised of the historians Ranajit Guha, 
Shahid Amin, David Arnold, Partha Chatterjee, David Hardiman and Gyanendra Pandey. The 
first volume of their collected works was published in 1982. Guha’s 1983 text “Elementary 
aspects of peasant insurgency in colonial India” is generally viewed as the foundational text 
of this project.  
v “All the coupled oppositions on which philosophy is constructed”, notes Derrida, emerge of 
“a necessity such that one of the terms appears as… the other as “differed” within a systematic 
ordering of the same” (1973, 149). 
vi To quote Derrida: 
The trace has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very 
structure of the trace. Effacement must always be able to overtake the trace; 
otherwise it would not be a trace but an indestructible and monumental 
substance. In addition, and from the start, effacement constitutes it as a trace – 
effacement establishes the trace in a change of place and makes it disappear in 
its appearing…” (1973, 156). 
vii In a statement commemorating the anniversary of leak, the then-CEO of UCC, Warren 
Andersen noted: 
We saw Bhopal for what it was – a terrible tragedy involving real people who 
had either lost family members or had suffered injuries, in some cases serious 
injuries. They needed medical relief, prompt aid in any form possible, and an 
early settlement which would help restore their lives and bring long-term relief. 
They didn’t need what they ultimately got – armies of lawyers and politicians 
who spent years claiming to represent them and deciding what was in their best 
interests. We saw Bhopal in moral – not in legal – terms. Although we had good 
legal defences – the plant wasn’t ours and it later was established that the 
tragedy had been caused by employee sabotage – we didn’t want to spend years 
arguing those issues in court while the victims waited. We therefore said 
immediately that Union Carbide Corporation would take any moral 
responsibility for the disaster. (printed in Fortun 2001, 99; emphasis added)  
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viii Arguing for the dismissal of claims filed by survivors of the leak in U.S. courts, the defense 
for UCC sought to highlight  
the practical impossibility for American courts and juries, imbued with US 
cultural values, living standards and expectations, to determine living standards 
for people living in the slums or ‘hutments’ surrounding UCIL, Bhopal, India, 
[thus] confirm[ing] that the Indian forum is overwhelmingly the most 
appropriate. Such abject poverty and the vastly different values, standards and 
expectations which accompany it are commonplace in India and the third 
world. They are incomprehensible to Americans living in the United States. 
(Amnesty International 2004, 51; emphasis added)  
Indeed, the invocation of such difference enabled UCC to advance a sabotage theory that 
relied on the image of ‘a typical worker – stupid, vindictive, prone to lying’ (Chouhan et al. 
1994).  
ix This description of ‘postcolonial’ differs from the more common temporal understanding of 
the term. For a critique of this temporal association, see Shohat 1992. 
x Although Spillers’ work focuses on blackness and sits firmly with the tradition of black 
thought, her account of the violence of slavery as subalternising violence has much to offer 
the project of postcolonial critique. It is as such that I engage her work without any allusion 
of uniformity or agreement between black and postcolonial history and critique. 
